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Abstract 1 
Humans feel a sense of agency over the effects their motor system causes. This is the case for 2 
manual actions such as pushing buttons, kicking footballs, and all acts that affect the physical 3 
environment. We ask whether initiating joint attention – causing another person to follow our 4 
eye movement – can elicit an implicit sense of agency over this congruent gaze response. Eye 5 
movements themselves cannot directly affect the physical environment, but joint attention is 6 
an example of how eye movements can indirectly cause social outcomes. Here we show that 7 
leading the gaze of an on-screen face induces an underestimation of the temporal gap 8 
between action and consequence (Experiments 1 and 2). This underestimation effect, named 9 
‘temporal binding,’ is thought to be a measure of an implicit sense of agency. Experiment 3 10 
asked whether merely making an eye movement in a non-agentic, non-social context might 11 
also affect temporal estimation, and no reliable effects were detected, implying that 12 
inconsequential oculomotor acts do not reliably affect temporal estimations under these 13 
conditions. Together, these findings suggest that an implicit sense of agency is generated 14 
when initiating joint attention interactions. This is important for understanding how humans 15 
can efficiently detect and understand the social consequences of their actions. 16 
 Keywords 17 
Gaze leading, Joint attention, Sense of agency, Temporal binding, Social cognition.  18 
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Eyes that Bind Us: Gaze Leading Induces an Implicit Sense of Agency 19 
1. Introduction 20 
The effects our motor system have on the environment need to be accurately detected. 21 
Action monitoring in humans gives rise to a sense of agency whereby we become conscious 22 
of our own actions (Gallagher, 2000). Such actions might be grasping objects or pushing 23 
buttons. However, some of the most important actions we execute do not directly affect the 24 
non-social, physical world, but do affect the social world. That is, some actions lead to 25 
changes in other people’s actions (e.g. Casper, Christensen, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016). 26 
One such ubiquitous social action is that when we look somewhere, other humans may 27 
spontaneously reorient their own gaze in the same direction, thus establishing joint attention 28 
(Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 2007). Joint attention is an everyday but important example that 29 
shows that, although eye movements cannot directly affect inanimate objects (aside from 30 
modern emerging gaze-controlled technologies, Slobodenvuk, 2016), changes in our gaze 31 
direction can influence other people. Moreover, saccades are the most common action we 32 
perform; we foveate a new area of the visual field 3-5 times each second (Schiller, 1998). 33 
However, there is little evidence that saccades evoke a sense of agency in a similar way to 34 
manual actions. We, therefore, tested whether an implicit sense of oculomotor agency over a 35 
conspecific’s gaze shift response emerges in joint attention. 36 
Because eye movements are a special form of action, they may not necessarily engage 37 
the same mechanisms underpinning agency as those engaged by other effectors. 38 
Nevertheless, there is a clear advantage in having robust agency detection systems for social 39 
outcomes elicited by our own actions, so a common mechanism that generalises between all 40 
effectors and outcome types could also be posited. Efficiently detecting the social effects we 41 
have caused may be critical to understanding others’ actions and support mental state 42 
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ascription (Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2016). Thus, the importance of understanding the role for 43 
agency in social action is critical for the understanding of social cognition. 44 
There is one recent paper that suggests that people can learn to understand the 45 
contingencies between their saccades and a bouncing ball stimulus on a screen (Grgič, 46 
Crespi, & de’Sperati, 2016), which is an initial piece of evidence that the effects of saccades 47 
can be explicitly self-attributed. However, explicitly measuring sense of agency does not 48 
provide a full picture and can be problematic. This is because explicit measures are somewhat 49 
limited as self-reported feelings of control over an action depend on the actor’s own ability 50 
for introspection (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; David et al., 2008; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007). 51 
Moreover, as Gallagher (2012) points out, self-agency is not normally something of which 52 
we are typically aware. Explicit measures are further criticised for their susceptibility to 53 
response bias and impression management (Obhi, 2012).  Because of this, an alternative is to 54 
measure sense of agency implicitly with a measure that does not ask the participant to 55 
introspect about their explicit experience of control.  Inferring sense of agency from implicit 56 
measures of correlated, potentially underlying mechanisms, has been a revealing approach 57 
(Barlas & Obhi, 2013). This can be achieved by exploiting an effect known as temporal 58 
binding (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), whereby perception of the temporal distance 59 
between act and outcome is compressed for self-generated acts, and relatively accurate when 60 
judging the gap between two non-self-related stimuli (Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review).  61 
This is why the temporal binding effect is theorised to measure an implicit sense of agency 62 
(see Haggard, 2017, for review).  63 
Here, we adopt a twofold approach of measuring the sense of agency: temporal 64 
binding (which we offer as an implicit measure of agency) and self-reported ratings of felt 65 
control (an explicit measure of agency). We considered this necessary because explicit 66 
measures and binding effects do not always correlate, suggesting they may not reflect the 67 
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exact same processes (e.g. Dewey & Knoblich, 2014, but see Ebert & Wegner, 2010, where 68 
changes in temporal binding were found to be related to explicit self-reports of agency). This 69 
possible dissociation between explicit and implicit agency are incorporated into an optimal 70 
cue integration account where implicit agency operates at a sensorimotor level, whilst explicit 71 
agency emerges following higher level processing (see Synovik et al., 2013).  72 
Relatedly, sense of agency may arise both from predictive model-based mechanisms 73 
and postdictive mechanisms (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Haggard, 2017; Synofzik, 74 
Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). According to the predictive model, the sense of agency is produced 75 
when there is a match between the predicted and the actual sensory outcome from an action 76 
(Blakemore et al., 2002). The retrospective or postdictive model, however, conceptualises a 77 
comparison between the action’s idea and action’s effect and a sense of agency arises if they 78 
are similar (Chambon & Haggard, 2013). Moore, Wegner, and Haggard (2009) argued that 79 
different, and varied, agency cues are integrated to result in a sense of agency (e.g. 80 
consequences of actions and sensorimotor prediction). Moore, Middleton. Haggard, and 81 
Fletcher (2012) tested this by exploring whether explicit and implicit agency were modulated 82 
differently by sequential patterns of action and outcome. Their results supported a model in 83 
which explicit and implicit agency can be thought of as dissociable, but, they argued, the two 84 
are not completely independent systems. This is consistent with Synovik et al’s (2013) 85 
optimal integration cue account in which explicit and implicit agency can both be included. 86 
Given this reviewed evidence, we aimed to measure the temporal binding effect associated 87 
with an implicit sense of agency and collect self-report explicit ratings of agency as a 88 
manipulation check. 89 
The temporal binding phenomenon has been associated with implicit sense of agency 90 
over physical actions that cause auditory (e.g. Barlas & Obhi, 2014), and visual outcomes 91 
(Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2011). Investigations of interpersonal agency have been more 92 
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limited, though agency is recognised as a critical aspect of joint action (Sebanz, Bekkering, & 93 
Knoblich 2006). Some studies have demonstrated a sense of agency over others’ actions 94 
during joint tasks (Obhi & Hall, 2011; Pfister, Obhi, Rieger, & Wenke, 2014), and by illusory 95 
agent misidentification (e.g. Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Interpersonal dynamics 96 
can modulate agency (e.g. under social coercion, Caspar et al., 2016). Social outcomes of 97 
physical acts have been studied by Yoshie and Haggard (2013), who showed that the valence 98 
of human vocalisations that served as a consequence of their participants’ actions modulated 99 
temporal binding (but see Moreton, Callan, & Hughes, 2016). These studies offer some 100 
evidence that a social outcome from a button press can elicit binding. In one version of this 101 
paradigm, participants are asked to replicate the time interval they have just experienced (e.g. 102 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2010). We apply this notion of social sense of agency, measured 103 
using a time interval reproduction paradigm, to a crucial component of social cognition – 104 
joint attention - a key way in which humans communicate. 105 
The above-reviewed binding evidence suggests that the socio-affective consequences 106 
of actions are coded in a generally similar way to non-social outcomes. Previous studies have 107 
shown saccade control can be guided by action-outcome effects, albeit in a non- social 108 
context (e.g Huestegge & Kreutzfeldt, 2012; Riechelmann, Pieczykolan, Horstmann, Herwig, 109 
& Huestegge, 2017). Relatedly, one eye-tracking study demonstrated that action-effect 110 
associations are made by the oculomotor system within a social context (Herwig & 111 
Hortsmann, 2011). Participants learned that their saccades triggered changes to onscreen 112 
facial expressions and adjusted their saccade accordingly. When they anticipated their 113 
saccade would trigger a smiling face, saccades landed near the mouth region and when they 114 
anticipated triggering a frown, saccades landed near the eyebrow region. This revealing 115 
finding illustrates how oculomotor actions can be influenced by perceived outcomes within a 116 
social context.  117 
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The actions studied thus far in the temporal binding literature are mostly restricted to 118 
button presses (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). In joint attention, the initiating act is 119 
an eye movement, whereby the gaze leader looks at an object, and a follower orients their 120 
attention to the same object (Frischen et al., 2007). Recent work has shown that people more 121 
efficiently detect instances when their gaze has been followed (Edwards, Stephenson, 122 
Dalmaso, & Bayliss, 2015), and that leading others’ gaze has consequences for subsequent 123 
interactions with those individuals (Bayliss et al., 2013; Dalmaso, Edwards & Bayliss, 2016). 124 
Having one’s eyes followed may necessarily involve the generation of a sense of agency over 125 
another’s congruent gaze response. Indeed, people do explicitly express a feeling of control 126 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2012) and naturalness (Bayliss et al., 2013) in such scenarios. Establishing 127 
with temporal binding that similar processes underpin implicit agency in social gaze orienting 128 
as with physical acts, would be an important advance in our understanding of how social 129 
attention operates. Specifically, such a finding could help to explain why noticing that 130 
someone else has followed your gaze to establish joint attention is such a powerful 131 
experience, despite it being a common occurrence (e.g. Edwards et al., 2015; Bayliss et al., 132 
2013). That is, rather than merely detecting that one’s gaze has been followed, we interpret 133 
the social response as a causal outcome of our initial action. 134 
Alternatively, it may not be this straightforward. There are also reasons to think that 135 
social agency might operate very differently to non-social agency. We have an enormous 136 
amount of experience of our physical manipulations of objects in the environment producing 137 
temporally contiguous outcomes. For example, when we kick a ball, it immediately moves. 138 
Therefore, the temporal window within which we become aware that our actions have 139 
produced an outcome are easily predictable. However, when we produce an action in order to 140 
elicit an outcome in another person, the temporal contiguity of the outcome has much more 141 
variance, making it harder to predict (Kunde, Weller, & Pfister, 2017). For example, a person 142 
AGENCY FOR GAZE LEADING 
 
 
7 
may not immediately respond to our request to pass us an object nor may they immediately 143 
respond to our gaze signals, if their attention was elsewhere. The variance inherent in social 144 
interactions is one reason why implicit agency might work differently in social compared 145 
with non-social contexts. On the one hand, the variance might mean that temporal binding 146 
effects associated with implicit sense of agency might not emerge at all because social agency 147 
detection relies on higher-level mechanisms such as Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 148 
1978) to make sense of social cause-and-effect. On the other hand, the instability of social 149 
interactions might actually elicit very reliable effects because of the critical importance of 150 
social agency detection, which could be underpinned by a system flexible enough to tolerate 151 
the inherent variance. Therefore, whether saccades that cause a social outcome could elicit 152 
temporal binding associated with implicit agency is an interesting open question for work 153 
both on social cognition and action monitoring. 154 
In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that gaze leading elicits temporal 155 
binding, which is offered as a measure of an implicit sense of agency (see Haggard, 2017, for 156 
a review). Participants’ time interval reproductions between an object’s appearance and an 157 
onscreen face looking at that object were compared between two tasks: an active task when a 158 
gaze leading saccade was made to the object, and a passive task in which no such gaze 159 
leading was performed. Therefore, we predicted that we would find greater temporal binding 160 
when participants’ eyes were followed to an object (Active Gaze Leading conditions) than 161 
when no saccades to the object were made (Passive conditions). Our data are consistent with 162 
this hypothesis, providing evidence that an implicit sense of agency, inferred from temporal 163 
binding, is generated in the gaze leader when their gaze is followed, establishing joint 164 
attention. A third experiment examined whether making an eye movement alone  could 165 
explain the temporal compression effects found in Experiments 1 and 2, but no reliable 166 
effects were detected. 167 
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2. Experiment 1 168 
In Experiment 1, participants completed an interval reproduction task under three 169 
conditions manipulated within-subjects. In the active task, for which we predicted reliable 170 
temporal binding, participants replicated the time interval between an object’s appearance, to 171 
which the participants were to immediately saccade, and the on-screen face’s gaze shift 172 
towards the object. As typical for temporal binding paradigms, we compared performance in 173 
the ‘active’ condition with a ‘passive’ condition in which no action is made by the 174 
participant. In the “Passive Face Fixation” condition participants fixated the face throughout.  175 
To provide a further control against which to compare any binding effects in the active task, 176 
we added a “Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation” condition.  Here, we replaced the face with a 177 
non-social stimulus. A strength of our design is that participants in all conditions estimated 178 
the temporal gap between the same two events – the object appearing and the main stimulus 179 
(a face in two of three conditions) changing. In the active condition, participants saccaded 180 
after the object’s appearance, and were instructed that their saccade was the cause of the on-181 
screen face moving its eyes. We also had participants complete the Autism Spectrum 182 
Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-183 
reported measure of autism-like traits. In all experiments, we have reported how we 184 
determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations and all measures. 185 
2.1. Method 186 
2.1.1. Participants 187 
Thirty-two participants (mean age=20.6 years; 2 were men) completed the study in 188 
return for course credit. We determined our target sample size by considering our relevant 189 
observed effect sizes in a previous study using the interval reproduction task (dz=.84-1.44; 190 
Howard, Edwards, & Bayliss, 2016) and from appraising the wider literature. Anticipating a 191 
large effect size dz = .8, with 1-E = 0.95 at D = .05, would require n = 23. However, it seemed 192 
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appropriate here to anticipate a potentially smaller effect size than typically observed in 193 
temporal binding experiments using non-social actions, given the inherent variance 194 
associated with social responses to our own actions. We therefore targeted a sample of n=32, 195 
as this is closer to those used by ourselves and others to address similar questions. 196 
Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical approval was granted by 197 
the School of Psychology Ethics Committee, University of East Anglia. All participants were 198 
drawn from the Psychology undergraduate programme, were naïve to the aims of the study 199 
and gave written, informed consent. 200 
2.1.2. Stimuli 201 
The female face stimulus was a grayscale photograph with a calm expression 202 
(280×374 pixels) taken from Bayliss, Bartlett, Naughtin and Kritikos (2011), and had three 203 
versions: eyes direct, eyes closed and looking right. The object stimuli set comprised eight 204 
objects commonly found in the kitchen (varying in size; see Bayliss et al., 2013). The centre 205 
of the face was located 5 cm left-of-centre onscreen. The objects were presented 11.5cm to 206 
the right of the face. For one of the three conditions, a phase-scrambled version of the face 207 
was produced, comprising a rectangle (280x374 pixels) with two smaller rectangles (37x26 208 
pixels) placed where the eyes would be on the face. The smaller rectangles were phase 209 
scrambled versions of the face stimulus’ eye regions. Stimuli appeared on a black background 210 
and were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (see Figure 1).   211 
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Fig. 1. 212 
Trial sequence for the Active Gaze Leading task. Red circles and the arrow were not 213 
displayed but represent where participants were instructed to fixate and the saccade from the 214 
face to the object, respectively. Participants looked at the face (a), displayed for 1000ms. 215 
Participants made a saccade (b) to the object as soon as it appeared. After a random inter-216 
event interval of 400ms to 2300ms, gaze onset (c) occurred. After 1000ms, estimate 217 
instruction appeared (d) until response. Participants pressed and released the space bar to 218 
replicate the inter-event interval. The inter-event interval is the time between the object 219 
appearing and the gaze onset.  220 
 221 
2.1.3. Apparatus and materials 222 
Right eye position was tracked with an infrared eye tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR 223 
Research, Ontario, Canada; resolution 0.10, 500 Hz). A chin rest was used to maintain head 224 
stability. Viewing distance was 70cm from eyes to a 45 cm monitor (resolution 1024×768 225 
pixels). A standard keyboard was used for manual responses. The Autism Spectrum Quotient 226 
Questionnaire was used as a measure of levels of autism-like traits (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al.,  227 
2001), presented using E Prime. A 1-8 scale was used for participants’ self-reported feelings 228 
of agency in each condition, with 8 representing the highest feeling of agency.  229 
2.1.4. Design 230 
The within-subjects design had three blocked conditions of 56 trials per task. Block 231 
order was counterbalanced across participants. There were six possible orders with six 232 
participants experiencing one order, six participants undergoing another order, and the 233 
remaining four orders had five participants each. The conditions were Active Gaze Leading, 234 
Passive Face Fixation and Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation. The dependent measure was 235 
the proportional reproduction error (RE), calculated by dividing the reproduced time interval 236 
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by the actual time interval to calculate mean proportional reproduction. Thus, 100% 237 
reproduction would be reproduction with no error at all. The inter-event interval was the time 238 
between an object’s appearance and a subsequent on-screen gaze shift (Active Gaze Leading 239 
and Passive Face Fixation) or a spatial shift (Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation condition) 240 
towards the object. The temporal gap between the object’s appearance (rather than the 241 
saccade) and the face’s response was used to allow direct comparison between all conditions 242 
(as no saccades are made in passive conditions). We also had a correlational design to 243 
examine any associations between levels of AQ and degree of temporal binding. 244 
2.1.5. Procedure 245 
Each experimental block commenced with a standard nine point eye tracking 246 
calibration, then 8 practice trials, then 56 experimental trials (see Figure 1). In the Active 247 
Gaze Leading task, for which we predicted reliable temporal binding, each trial began with 248 
the presentation of the face on the left side of the screen, looking straight ahead. Participants 249 
were instructed to look at the face (presented for 1000 ms) until an object appeared on the 250 
right of the face. This sudden onset was the participant’s cue to immediately saccade to it. 251 
Participants were told they must fixate on the object as soon as it appeared in the Active Gaze 252 
Leading task in order to cause the face to follow their gaze. Participants were instructed to 253 
fixate on the object after their gaze leading saccade, until the gaze shift occurred. After a 254 
randomly selected inter-event interval of 400-2300ms following the onset of the object, the 255 
face’s gaze shifted to the right to look at the object. Participants were given no further 256 
instructions about where to look after their gaze leading saccade, apart from that they must 257 
maintain fixation on the object until the gaze shift occurred. After 1000ms, the word 258 
“Estimate” appeared (white font, Courier, 18pt) above and below the face. This prompted the 259 
participant to manually press and hold down the spacebar for a duration that to their best 260 
ability replicated the time interval between the object’s appearance and the face’s gaze shift 261 
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towards it. Participants were given no feedback about their responses. Finally, after releasing 262 
the spacebar, the display cleared to black for 1000ms. 263 
To be clear about the particulars of this ‘Active’ Gaze Leading condition, participants 264 
were told that their rapid saccade to the object was the causal event that made the face’s eyes 265 
follow theirs. We were able to confirm that this was the impression that participants had with 266 
the explicit agency ratings task (details in Results section 2.2.2). We relied on the low 267 
variance of saccadic RT and spatial acuity in this very simple eye movement task to ensure 268 
that the minimum temporal gap of 400ms was greater than the vast majority of saccades. 269 
Moreover, timing the temporal gap from a single fixed onset that occurred in all conditions 270 
(the object onset) afforded us a straightforward and direct comparison across conditions.  271 
The first control condition, in which we predict accurate temporal reproduction, was 272 
the ‘Passive Face Fixation’ task. This was identical to the Active Gaze Leading condition, 273 
except that 1) the participant maintained fixation throughout on the face, and 2) the face had 274 
closed eyes at the start of each trial before looking to the right following the appearance of 275 
the object. The final control condition, Passive Phase-scrambled task, used a rectangle 276 
comprised of the phase scrambled face, with two smaller, phase scrambled rectangular 277 
regions, which provided a spatial shift towards the object, instead of a gaze shift. The phase 278 
scrambled rectangles, positioned in the place the eyes would have been, shifted 2mm to the 279 
right after the inter-event interval. The size of the 2mm spatial shift was chosen as this was 280 
the same spatial shift as the eyes moved in the Active Gaze Leading condition. In both these 281 
passive control conditions, participants were instructed to fixate the face/phase-scrambled 282 
face throughout each trial, and replicate the interval between object onset and averted gaze 283 
onset. It was emphasised to them that they were not causing the gaze shift to occur. After 284 
each task (at the end of a 56 trial block) participants self-reported their degree of felt control 285 
over the face’s eye movements or the rectangles shifting. The instruction was “Please rate 286 
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how much control you felt over the onscreen face’s eye movements/rectangles shifting from 287 
1 to 8, 1 meaning no control at all to 8 meaning a lot of control.” Finally, participants 288 
completed the AQ on the computer. 289 
2.2. Results 290 
2.2.1. Proportional Reproduction 291 
Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs above or below their individual 292 
means were removed (0.41% of trials). Mean proportional reproduction was calculated for 293 
each participant in each condition and submitted to statistical analysis (see Figure 2). We 294 
divided the reproduced time interval by the actual time interval to calculate mean 295 
proportional reproduction.  Therefore, 100% reproduction represents perfect accuracy, 296 
anything greater than 100% is over-reproduction, and less than 100% is temporal 297 
compression (under-reproduction). We report Greenhaus-Geisser corrected degrees of 298 
freedom when applicable. Confidence intervals and standard errors around the means are 299 
based on 1000 bootstrap samples. We report confidence intervals around effect sizes and 300 
have used ESCI (Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals) to calculate these 301 
(Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017). 302 
First, in order to establish whether each condition produced temporal compression 303 
(reliable under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze onset), or relatively 304 
accurate reproductions, we performed single sample t-tests for each of the three conditions 305 
using proportional reproduction. This showed that temporal compression was only 306 
statistically significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, participants reproduced 307 
M=84% of the veridical time interval, 95% CI [73, 96] (SD=32%), t(31)=2.76, p=.01, 308 
dz=0.69, 95% CI [0.18, 1.19]. In the two passive conditions, reproduction errors (REs) were 309 
low and did not differ statistically from 100% reproduction (Passive Face Fixation condition: 310 
M=100% reproduction, 95% CI [91, 112], SD=30%, t(31)=0.09, p=.926, dz=0.02, 95% CI [-311 
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0.51,0.47]; Passive Phase-scrambled, M=94% reproduction, 95% CI [82, 100], SD=30%, 312 
t(31)=1.09, p=.286, dz=0.27, 95% CI [-0.22; 0.76]. There was a main effect of task, 313 
F(1.53,47.42)=10.91, MSE=207, p<.001,Kp2=0.260, and follow-up contrasts showed that the 314 
proportional temporal compression effect in the Active Gaze Leading condition was greater 315 
than in both the Passive Face Fixation, t(31)=3.73, p=.001, dz=0.52, 95% CI [0.21,0.82] and 316 
Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation conditions t(31)=3.17, p=.003, dz=0.32, 95% CI 317 
[0.10,0.52].  Therefore, our hypothesis that having participants’ deliberately-initiated saccade 318 
followed would result in greater temporal compression than passive conditions (where no 319 
saccades were made) was supported. 320 
 321 
Fig. 2. 322 
Mean percentage reproductions by condition for both experiments. In Gaze Leading tasks, 323 
participants looked first at the face, and then at an object as soon as it appeared. In the 324 
Passive Face or Passive Phase Scrambled tasks, participants looked at the face or scrambled 325 
face throughout. In the Passive Object task (Experiment 2), participants looked at the 326 
placeholder/object throughout. The images show how the face/scrambled stimulus was 327 
displayed when gaze onset occurred. Red circles and the arrow were not displayed but 328 
represent where participants were instructed to fixate (and the saccade from the face to the 329 
object for the Active tasks). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-330 
subjects designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 331 
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2.2.2. Secondary measures, manipulation checks, and participant subset analyses 332 
Mean self-reported explicit ratings of agency were greater for the Active Gaze 333 
Leading (M=4.44, SD=2.09), than both the Passive Face Fixation (M=2.25, SD=1.61) and 334 
Passive Phase Scrambled Fixation (2.03, SD=1.43) conditions; t’s>6, p’s<.001, dz’s>1. This 335 
shows that participants felt a degree of explicit agency in the Gaze Leading condition, 336 
supporting our inference that the temporal binding effect presented here reflects a sense of 337 
agency. The mean AQ score was 16.59 (SD=5.58), which is normative, and did not correlate 338 
significantly with reproduction error in any condition (r< -.15, p>.4). 339 
We also considered potential concerns that something about performing a saccade per 340 
se might explain our data. Saccades can, indeed, affect time perception; a substantial amount 341 
of work has demonstrated an expansive effect (chronostasis; see review by Merchant & 342 
Yarrow, 2016), which if present in our data would of course increase our participants’ 343 
estimates (i.e. this effect, if present, would work in opposition to our predicted and 344 
demonstrated effects). However, two studies have noted an opposing compressive effect 345 
(Morrone, Ross & Burr, 2005; Yabe & Goodale, 2015). These opposing effects are small and 346 
of similar magnitude so would cancel each other out were they to be present in our (rather 347 
different) task, so are unlikely to account for our data. In the critical Active Gaze Leading 348 
condition, mean saccadic reaction time was 220ms (SD=41ms) and mean saccade duration 349 
was 81ms (SD=44ms). 350 
Further data exploration included checking for saccades executed after the onscreen 351 
face had moved its eyes, which was possible in our design. This could happen, for example, if 352 
the participant was rather slow on a trial with a short time interval. This could potentially 353 
affect the way that the participant perceived the agency of the social context. Such 354 
occurrences were present in nine participants, and on a maximum of three trials for a given 355 
participant (and a total of 0.7% of active trials). We reanalyzed the explicit and implicit data 356 
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excluding all nine of these participants and found that the data pattern was very similar 357 
without these participants. Their mean explicit ratings are not different to those who never 358 
experienced this (M=4.5, SD=2.22 and M = 4.41, SD=2.15, respectively). Temporal 359 
compression was only statistically significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, 360 
participants reproduced M=84%, 95% CI [74,95] (SD=30%), of the veridical time interval 361 
t(22)=2.49, p=.02, dz=0.73, 95% CI [0.13,1.3]. In the two passive conditions, reproduction 362 
errors were low and did not differ statistically from 100% reproduction, Passive Face 363 
Fixation condition: M=103%, 95% CI [93,113] SD=23%, t(22)=0.597, p=.556, dz=0.18, 95% 364 
CI [-0.75,0.40]; Passive Phase-scrambled, M=98%, 95% CI [87,109], SD=25%, t(22)=0.31, 365 
p=.763, dz= 0.09, 95% CI [-0.49,0.67].  366 
To check whether passive tasks were compromised by saccades occurring contrary to 367 
the fixation instruction, we also examined erroneous saccades; on only 0.28% of trials were 368 
saccades made in error to the object during the Passive Face task and in 0.11% of trials in the 369 
Passive Scrambled condition. These few trials are unlikely to have had a critical impact on 370 
the data. Thus, overall, saccade metrics cannot parsimoniously explain the observed time 371 
underestimation in the Active task at the trial or participant levels.  372 
As this is the first attempt to our knowledge using a temporal binding paradigm with 373 
saccades as the action, it is useful to examine whether our data share another commonality 374 
often observed in manual tasks in order to inform comparability across effectors. Previous 375 
temporal binding research using interval replication or estimation methodologies show 376 
stronger effects with longer intervals (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Wen, Yamashita, & 377 
Asama, 2015). In order to determine whether our data share this latter characteristic of the 378 
temporal binding phenomenon, we compared performance of each participant on the longer 379 
50% of intervals they estimated with the shorter 50% of intervals they estimated. In order to 380 
establish whether this pattern is present in our data we instead used the reproduction error as 381 
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the measure, calculated in milliseconds as the participants’ reproduction of the temporal 382 
interval between two events minus the veridical temporal interval (rather than the proportion 383 
error used in the main analysis). The temporal compression effect was larger with the longer 384 
intervals, t(31)=10.27, p<.001, dz=1.75. This corroborates the notion that the observed data 385 
reflects a temporal binding effect, rather than some form of previously unreported saccade-386 
induced temporal discounting effect that would most likely be either proportional to saccade 387 
metrics, or in fact be stronger for short intervals, not weaker (given the timescale of saccades, 388 
and the timescale of previously observed interactions between saccades and time perception). 389 
We can, therefore, confidently assert this effect is temporal compression of a similar nature to 390 
that previously observed following manual actions that cause physical outcomes.  391 
2.3. Discussion 392 
Participants reliably under-reproduced the temporal gap between an object appearing 393 
in the periphery, and an on-screen face responding by looking towards the same object, only 394 
when participants moved their eyes to that object in the belief that they caused the face to 395 
follow their eyes. This is an indication that participants’ eye movements resulted in an 396 
implicit sense of agency, the magnitude of which compares to temporal binding paradigms 397 
using manual actions that cause changes to the physical environment (Moore & Obhi, 2012). 398 
In both of our passive control conditions, our participants did not move their eyes to cause a 399 
social response, and they were rather accurate in their time reproductions. Therefore, we can 400 
be confident that the eye movement in the critical gaze leading condition caused the temporal 401 
compression associated with an implicit sense of agency. 402 
3. Experiment 2 403 
In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate the temporal binding effect in the Active Gaze 404 
Leading condition. It is notable that the Passive Face Fixation condition from Experiment 1 405 
involved a face with closed eyes, whereas the Active Gaze Leading condition began the trials 406 
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with direct gaze. This leaves open the possibility that this initial social contact of direct gaze 407 
is critical. To explore this, in Experiment 2, we instead had the active condition begin with 408 
closed eyes, and two passive control conditions begin with open eyes. One of the passive 409 
control conditions replicated that of Experiment 1, with face fixation throughout. The new 410 
passive control condition had participants gaze at the object throughout the trial, which 411 
allowed us to examine the importance of end-state gaze location. This was because we 412 
sometimes have our gaze followed after deliberate gaze leading, but we also have gaze 413 
followed incidentally when we happen to have been observed looking at an object. This is a 414 
scenario which is specifically found in a joint attention interaction, that is, gaze can be 415 
followed after deliberate gaze leading, but joint attention can result from a person following 416 
our passive attention to an object of interest, without any deliberate intention to engage in 417 
joint attention. It is, therefore, possible that agency may be experienced during joint attention 418 
when our gaze is followed incidentally, without a deliberate, gaze leading saccade. The new 419 
control condition enabled us to explore this possibility.  420 
3.1. Method 421 
A new sample of participants (n=32; mean age=19.7 years, four were men) was 422 
recruited from the same population as Experiment 1 and took part in return for course credits. 423 
The same stimuli were used as Experiment 1. The design involved changes to the three task 424 
conditions. The Active Gaze Leading condition was the same as Experiment 1 except that the 425 
onscreen face began each trial with closed eyes. The Passive Face Fixation task had the face 426 
commence with direct gaze. The new third condition, Passive Object Fixation, entailed the 427 
addition of a grey fixation dot (Courier, 18pt), which the participants were required to fixate 428 
at the start of each trial in this task and was where the object subsequently appeared. 429 
Therefore, in this Passive Object Fixation task, the onscreen gaze response occurred when 430 
participants were already looking at the object, not having first performed a gaze leading 431 
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saccade to it. The procedure and task for participants was the same in all other respects for 432 
Experiment 2 as the previous experiment. 433 
3.2. Results 434 
3.2.1. Proportional Reproduction 435 
  Trials in which participants’ estimates were 3SDs above or below their individual 436 
means were removed (0.28% of trials). The same processing and analysis was performed on 437 
the data as in Experiment 1. First, in order to establish whether each condition produced 438 
temporal compression (reliable under-reproductions of the time between object and gaze 439 
onset), or relatively accurate reproductions, we performed single sample t-tests for each of 440 
the three conditions on the proportional reproductions. This showed that temporal 441 
compression was only statistically significant in the Active Gaze Leading condition. Here, 442 
participants reproduced the temporal gap by M=80%, 95% CI [73,86] (SD=19%), t(31)=6.18, 443 
p<.001, dz=1.55, 95% CI [0.98, 2.10]. In the two passive conditions, reproduction did not 444 
differ statistically from 100% reproduction  (Passive Face Fixation condition: M=96%, 95% 445 
CI [88, 104], SD=23%, t(31)=1.00, p=.327, dz=0.25, 95% CI [-0.24,0.74]; Passive Object 446 
Fixation, M=90%, 95% CI [82,98], SD=22%, t(31)=2.70, p=.01, dz=0.67, 95% CI [0.17;1.18]. 447 
There was a main effect of task, F(2,62)=21.45, MSE=.221, p<.001, Kp2=0.409, and follow-448 
up contrasts showed that the proportional temporal compression effect in the Active Gaze 449 
Leading condition was greater than in both the Passive Face 450 
Fixation, t(31)=6.02, p<.001, dz=0.79, 95% CI [0.46, 1.11] and Passive Object 451 
conditions t(31)=4.17, p<001, dz=0.51, 95% CI [0.23, 0.77]. 452 
3.2.2. Secondary measures, manipulation checks and participant subset analyses 453 
As in Experiment 1, greater explicit agency was reported following the Active Gaze 454 
Leading (3.97, SD=1.79), than both the Passive Object Fixation (2.72, SD=1.57) and Passive 455 
Face Fixation (2.59, SD=1.50) conditions (t’s>3.6, p<.001, dz’s>0.7). The mean AQ score 456 
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was 15.06 (SD=6.35), and did not correlate with reproduction error in any condition (r< -.15, 457 
p>.4). In the critical Active Gaze Leading condition, mean saccadic reaction time was 219ms 458 
(SD=57ms), and mean saccade duration for the gaze leading saccade was 79ms (SD=69). 459 
There were only 0.6% of trials where the onscreen face gaze shift occurred before the 460 
participant’s saccade was completed.  We performed the same check as Experiment 1, by re-461 
analysing the data with the 9 participants excluded who experienced a gaze shift onscreen 462 
before their saccade was completed.  This was for only an average of 1.22 trials. These nine 463 
participant’s mean explicit ratings were not different to the rest of the sample (M = 3.66, 464 
SD=1.87 and M = 4.01, SD=1.75, respectively). The data showed a remarkably similar 465 
pattern. The Active Gaze Leading condition revealed temporal compression – participants 466 
reproduced 76%, 95% CI [68,84], SD=19% of the veridical time interval, t(22)=6.12, p<.001, 467 
dz=1.81, 95% CI [1.11,2.48]. The Passive Face Fixation condition did not produce temporal 468 
compression (M=92% reproduction, 95% CI [82,101] SD=23%, t(22)=1.77, p=.091, dz=0.52 469 
95% CI [-0.07,1.11]. However, the Passive Object Fixation task did reveal reliable under-470 
reproductions, of about one third less than that in the active condition; M=84% reproduction, 471 
95% CI [76,93] SD=19%, t(22)=3.87, p=.001, dz=1.14, 95% CI [0.51,1.76]. 472 
Saccades to the object in error were made on only 0.33% of trials during the Passive 473 
Face task. In the Passive Object task of Experiment 2, saccades in error away from the object 474 
to the face were made on only 0.06% of trials. Therefore, passive tasks were not 475 
compromised by erroneous saccades, just like Experiment 1, as these were so small in 476 
number. We ran the same split half analysis of binding by temporal interval as Experiment 1, 477 
and again showed larger effects with the longer intervals, t(31)=14.53, p<.001, dz=2.57, again 478 
supporting the notion that these are, indeed, temporal binding effects. 479 
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3.3. Discussion 480 
We replicated both the binding effects for the Active Gaze Leading task and the null 481 
binding effects for the Passive Face Fixation task. Binding in the Passive Object Fixation task 482 
was significantly attenuated compared with the Active Gaze Leading task, but was 483 
nevertheless statistically reliable and is worthy of discussion so we address this further in the 484 
General Discussion below. For now, we note that there could perhaps be an implicit sense of 485 
agency (albeit reduced) which can be generated when there is a shift towards our object of 486 
gaze, even if we feel we have only incidentally caused the gaze shift, rather than 487 
intentionally. 488 
4. Experiment 3 489 
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 It is possible that saccades alone - devoid of social or agentic context - could produce 490 
binding. However, known saccade temporal disturbances have only previously been 491 
demonstrated at short intervals of around 100ms (e.g. Morrone et al., 2005), whilst ours are 492 
longer with an average of 1350ms. Nevertheless, it is worth checking if the mere oculomotor 493 
act of a saccade can produce similar effects. It is interesting to note that most temporal 494 
binding studies do not investigate whether a non-agentic manual action might produce 495 
distorted temporal judgements in and of themselves. However, because we know that 496 
saccades do produce some temporal distortion (Morrone et al., 2005; Yabe & Goodale, 497 
2015), our approach affords an opportunity to explore this fundamental question. However, 498 
we also note here that, as our primary interest is in social cognition and agency, we look 499 
forward to further work being conducted on this question as it relates to core mechanisms of 500 
saccade control and temporal distortions because our single experiment may only provide 501 
indicative evidence one way or another. In Experiment 3, therefore, we tested two conditions 502 
with no social aspect or agentic expectation and predicted a null effect. 503 
4.1 Method 504 
A new sample of participants executed a saccade of the same amplitude as 505 
Experiments 1 and 2 between two fixation crosses in a Saccade task. They began fixation on 506 
a first cross and saccaded to a second cross, when it appeared.  After the second cross 507 
appeared, the first cross enlarged. Participants then reproduced the interval between the 508 
second cross appearing and the first cross enlarging. In a No Saccade task, they maintained 509 
fixation on the first cross throughout, and reproduced the same time interval as the Saccade 510 
task. Thus, participants were exposed to a sequence of perceptual events, but none of these 511 
events were social, and they experienced both a saccade task with the same temporal and 512 
spatial characteristics of Experiments 1 and 2 and a no saccade task. Furthermore, they were 513 
given no information about whether their eye movements were causing anything to occur. 514 
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This allowed us to test, for the first time to our knowledge, whether saccades alone – devoid 515 
of social context - can elicit temporal binding. A power analysis (GPower: Faul, Erdfelder, 516 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) using the mean gaze leading effects from Experiments 1 and 2, 517 
found that n=29, would deliver 1-E power=0.95. Therefore, our final sample of n=31 (after 518 
removing one participant who did not follow instructions) was appropriate.  519 
4.2 Results and Discussion 520 
We found no significant under-reproduction in the Saccade Task, M=94%, 95% CI 521 
[79,109] (SD=40%), t(30)=0.81, p=.427, dz=0.21, 95% CI [-0.29,0.70], nor in the No Saccade 522 
task,  M=105%, 95% CI [95,115] (SD=27%) t(30)=0.983, p=.333, dz=0.25, 95% CI [-0.75, 523 
0.25]. As our prediction was for a null effect to emerge in the Saccade task, we aimed to 524 
assist the interpretability of this null by performing a Bayes one-sample t-test (Rouder, 525 
Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson, 2009), using the expected effect size parameter as the 526 
average effect size from the active conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 of 1.12. This produced 527 
a JZS BF=5.82 in favour of the null suggesting that, from these data, the null hypothesis is 528 
5.82 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis. In addition, participants’ ratings of 529 
explicit agency were low in both conditions; Saccade Task M=2.13 (SD=1.45) and the No 530 
Saccade Task M=2.10 (SD=1.64). In the Passive Fixation Cross task, saccades in error to the 531 
second fixation cross were made on only 0.95% of trials. Taken together, this suggests that 532 
the motor act of the eye movement itself is unlikely to account for the temporal compression 533 
effects we found in the social context of an interaction with an onscreen face. 534 
5. General Discussion 535 
We investigated the influence of gaze leading on the temporal compression effect 536 
known as temporal binding, which is associated with sense of agency. We showed, for the 537 
first time, that responses to our eye signals, like other motor actions, produce temporal 538 
binding within a simulated social interaction. This is offered as evidence for a form of 539 
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oculomotor agency, which is informative for the understanding of social attention, and is 540 
more broadly of interest to the burgeoning field of technology with gaze-based interfaces 541 
(Slobodenyuk, 2016). Across four passive control conditions, we found no binding effects in 542 
three and an attenuated binding effect in the fourth. The explicit agency ratings supported our 543 
manipulation because greater ratings were made for active over passive tasks. We measured 544 
autism-like traits (AQ), but no relationship between binding and these were found. In a 545 
further control experiment, where fixation crosses replaced the face and object, we found no 546 
binding effects. 547 
Given the importance of joint attention in human social interactions, and the fact that 548 
saccades do not - outside of the laboratory, or through certain assistive technologies - cause 549 
physical outcomes, it was sensible to first investigate joint attention. As it turned out, our data 550 
are typical for the temporal binding literature, so we would in fact predict that intentional 551 
saccades that cause a different type of social outcome, or even a non-social outcome, would 552 
also produce temporal binding. Our present data can therefore contribute to, and open up new 553 
questions for social cognition and for the role of agency in eye movements per se. Given the 554 
similarity of our data to that of studies investigating non-social agency, our data are 555 
consistent with a common mechanism which attributes agency for social and non-social 556 
outcomes. The confirmation that saccades can elicit binding is of general importance for a 557 
field in which most of the outcomes resulting in binding are a consequence of a button press 558 
(see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). Relatedly, we note that in our active condition, the 559 
key saccade was voluntary, and it is therefore an interesting question as to whether or not 560 
reflexive exploratory saccades may drive similar agentic mechanisms.  561 
Learned outcomes from saccades when exploring faces can feedback to elicit changes 562 
to subsequent interactions (Herwig & Hortsmann, 2011). Taking this together with our data, 563 
we can offer a conceptual framework in which agency is experienced for gaze responses, and 564 
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this may be the mechanism needed for feedback to drive subsequent changes in saccadic 565 
behaviour. This would also help explain the changes in visual exploration people exhibit 566 
when inspecting faces with which they had previously engaged in joint attention (see Bayliss 567 
et al., 2013). This is also consistent with a theoretical framework of sociomotor action control 568 
offered by Kunde et al., (2017) whereby the social responses received from our actions 569 
feedback to plan subsequent social actions. Experiencing agency over the social responses to 570 
our actions is a prerequisite to that process. We need to detect agency over any gaze 571 
following we elicit in order to conclude whether we have successfully cued attention to the 572 
referent object, in order to then plan the on-going social engagement. Thus, detecting the 573 
influence that we have had over others’ attentional states may be critical for everyday social 574 
interactions and even support theory of mind processes. Determining that mechanisms 575 
engaged via physical acts generalise to oculomotor agency adds to what we know about gaze 576 
leading in terms of attention (Edwards et al., 2015), and reward value (Schilbach et al., 2010; 577 
Gordon, Eilbott, Feldman, & Vander Wyk, 2013). Agency may be a key piece of the puzzle 578 
that supports joint action with co-ordination and cooperation (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009).  579 
The lack of binding in passive conditions shows that the mere presence of a social 580 
stimulus does not interfere greatly with accurate timing of intervals per se. However, the 581 
weaker but reliable binding effect in the Passive Object Fixation task of Experiment 2 is 582 
curious. This observation could merely reflect a carry-over effect from the active task blocks 583 
(given our repeated measures design). However, we examined those participants who 584 
completed the Passive Object task first, and found that the binding effect was present 585 
(M=87% reproduction) and of a similar magnitude to the binding effect for all participants 586 
(M=90%), so carry-over effects are an unlikely explanation for the effects we found. 587 
Therefore, a more interesting (but speculative) suggestion would be that object-oriented 588 
attention in the presence of a face gazing at the same object might affect time estimation, 589 
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even in the absence of a recently preceding action. It could be the case that if we are looking 590 
at an object already, we may attribute some agency to an observed congruent eye shift; but 591 
the effect is stronger if we have recently saccaded to that object (as in the Active Gaze 592 
Leading condition). This chimes with work highlighting the critical importance of objects in 593 
joint attention (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Bayliss et al., 2013; Lobmaier, Fischer, & 594 
Schwaninger, 2006). It is perhaps this aspect of our data that might lead to future research 595 
into what might be ‘special’ about social agency – we can cause others to behave in a certain 596 
way due to our present state, or even because we have not acted. We need to detect these 597 
interactions as well. Therefore, there may be a hierarchical system which attributes the 598 
greatest sense of implicit agency for intentional gaze leading and then an attenuated sense of 599 
implicit agency if a gaze shift is detected when we are already directing our gaze towards an 600 
object incidentally. This notion implies the importance of causality, in addition to 601 
intentionality, in these effects (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 602 
2012). 603 
There are a host of boundary conditions that remain untested in order to establish the 604 
conditions necessary and sufficient to produce indices of implicit agency in social contexts. 605 
One important future condition to test is to establish whether the observed gaze response 606 
needs to be congruent with the participant’s saccadic action, or can be any response (e.g. to 607 
avert gaze, or to change emotional expression, for example). We speculate that possibly an 608 
incongruent gaze shift might elicit binding if we feel we have caused another to look away 609 
from our direction of interest.  Whether this would be binding of the same magnitude as a 610 
congruent gaze shift (or no binding at all) would be interesting for future studies to explore. 611 
The current results identify just one instance in which temporal binding can occur following a 612 
causal eye movement. Although determining the specificity of this effect is of course 613 
important for understanding the nature of the mechanisms involved, if future work were to 614 
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demonstrate that the effect does generalise widely, this would not necessarily reduce the 615 
direct importance of this mechanism for understanding how social cognition is supported by 616 
such basic sensorimotor mechanisms. 617 
One potential complication for the interpretation of our findings is that in both active 618 
and passive conditions, participants must detect the onset of the object in their periphery 619 
(while they are looking at the face). However, in the active tasks, the onset of the responding 620 
gaze shift is to be detected in their periphery because the participant is now looking at the 621 
object having performed a saccade, while in the passive conditions, the participant detects the 622 
gaze shift at their point of fixation, having not moved their eyes. This difference could have 623 
affected the speed of detection of the gaze shift across conditions. However, were participants 624 
to be slower to detect the gaze shift in their peripheral vision in the active task, this would 625 
have extended their time estimations, which means that our binding effects may have, if 626 
anything, been artificially relatively reduced. Despite this difference potentially working 627 
against our predictions, medium (Experiment 1) and large (Experiment 2) binding effect sizes 628 
emerged.  629 
Another notable aspect of our design is that we used closed eyes for the Passive Face 630 
task in Experiment 1 because we wanted to ensure participants could easily identify that the 631 
passive task was different to the active task (with open eyes), to ameliorate against potential 632 
carry-over effects. In Experiment 2, the face was depicted with closed eyes until averted gaze 633 
was displayed – no direct gaze towards the participant. The closed eyes at the outset could be 634 
interpreted as less agentic by participants, but this does not appear to be the case as explicit 635 
agency ratings were similar in both Experiments 1 and 2, as were the magnitude of binding 636 
effects (or even larger observed effect sizes in Experiment 2). We speculate that ambiguity 637 
may result in stronger attribution of agency when there is a spatial shift towards our direction 638 
of gaze. It may be adaptive to assume that we caused an outcome for which we believe – but 639 
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are uncertain - that we were responsible for eliciting. The consequences of under-attribution 640 
of responsibility for a social outcome could be particularly costly, whilst a little over-self-641 
attribution is unlikely to lead to adverse consequences. This explanation is consistent with 642 
recent findings reported by Desantis, Waszak, and Gorea (2016), who found that participants 643 
over-attribute self-agency when they are in an ambiguous situation. We suspect that this 644 
result may suggest that binding effects will emerge in instances where the end-point of joint 645 
gaze occurs (given that joint attention can be incidental, as well as deliberate – both of which 646 
are important to notice and interpret). This is another interesting line for future investigations 647 
with respect to social agency specifically.  648 
Although the null effects on temporal estimation in Experiment 3 support the notion 649 
that the data from Experiment 1 and 2 do reflect a temporal binding effect in a social setting, 650 
it is worthwhile considering that one might have expected reliable temporal underestimation 651 
even in the context of a non-agentic, non-social saccade task of Experiment 3. Specifically, it 652 
is known that eye movements do lead to temporal understimations (saccadic compression, 653 
e.g. Morrone et al., 2005), but this did not emerge clearly in Experiment 3 in our data. One 654 
explanation for this could be that the known saccadic-driven temporal effects may not be 655 
observable in the time intervals of the magnitude we employed here. Our temporal intervals 656 
varied around a mean of 1350ms, while the studies that have discovered saccade-triggered 657 
temporal disortions have typically employed much shorter intervals (~100ms, e.g. Morrone et 658 
al., 2005). 659 
Another potential reason for the failure to observe this temporal compressive effect of 660 
saccades per se is possibly due to the action of an opposing temporally expansive process, 661 
‘chronistasis’, which could operate simultaneously under our experimental conditions leading 662 
to temporal equilibrium (see Merchant & Yarrow, 2016, for a review and see also Knöll, 663 
Morrone, & Bremmer, 2013; Yarrow et al., 2001). Achieving this equilibrium may be 664 
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advantageous for spatio-temporal perceptual stability, and a naïve assumption would be that 665 
such equilibrium would emerge more readily after longer temporal intervals, hence we 666 
observed a null effect overall in Experiment 3. This is speculative, however, and it is clear 667 
that future explorations of the direct effects of saccades on timing estimates will assist with 668 
the contextualisation of our present data, and indeed with other work studying social 669 
cognition that involves interactive eye movements and other actions. 670 
Future work could employ a gaze-contingent design to explore agency in social gaze 671 
interactions. The present work did not take this approach. If we had yoked more directly the 672 
action of the participant to the stimulus changes by using gaze-contingent stimuli, we could 673 
have expected our participants to report a greater explicit sense of agency than we found here, 674 
and the temporal binding effects might have also been more stable. We did not employ a gaze 675 
contingent design here because we wished to avoid the introduction of a confound. 676 
Specifically, in the Active Saccade task the to-be-estimated time interval would have 677 
included three periods of temporal lag that would not be present in the Passive conditions, 678 
making them not comparible without off-line adjustment. These lag periods are the saccade 679 
latency, the saccade duration and the eyetracker uptake time to detect good fixation upon the 680 
object in order to cause the gaze shift. By not using gaze contingent stimuli, our chosen 681 
design afforded direct comparison of actual time intervals across conditions. Nevertheless, it 682 
is clear that future studies should employ gaze contingent designs that circumvent the issues 683 
we note above to overcome this limitation of the present research. This would allow for even 684 
more robust tests of hypotheses regarding the temporal dynamics of social gaze. 685 
We found no reliable correlations between binding effects and autism quotient scores. 686 
It may nevertheless be important to test similar paradigms in clinical samples given previous 687 
findings of sub-optimality for joint attention initiation (Mundy & Newell, 2007), and 688 
decreased temporal binding effects in autism (Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2014). 689 
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Relatedly, it is notable that some forms of psychosis, such as might be experienced by those 690 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, are associated with disrupted sense of agency (see 691 
Haggard, 2017, for a review). Therefore, this may generalise to problems with understanding 692 
other’s actions, which can be particularly problematic within the social setting of a joint 693 
attention interaction. These data are also of direct relevance for developers of gaze-controlled 694 
interfaces, a field that is currently grappling with issues of agency and control (Grgič et al., 695 
2016; Slobodenyuk, 2016). For example, our findings can help inform research into making 696 
human-robot interactions more naturalistic: when designing robots who can produce eye gaze 697 
responses to human gaze signals. Similarly, socially assistive robotics is a growing area 698 
where roboticists apply findings from cognitive science to inform the design of therapeutic 699 
interventions. Such interventions have been developed for a range of applications, including 700 
dementia, mental health, social communication for children with autism and stroke 701 
rehabilitation (see Matarić, 2017, for a review). Our research is also informative for 702 
developers of gaze-controlled interfaces more generally. Building on the boundary conditions 703 
for when eye movements can generate a similar sense of agency as other motor actions do, 704 
can inform how to make such technologies acceptable to users. Recent innovations of 705 
employing face/eye scanning in smartphones exemplify that using our eyes to control objects 706 
will soon be an everyday occurrence, so understanding oculomotor agency in social and non-707 
social contexts is of direct relevance to medical and consumer product development. 708 
To conclude, this study shows for the first time that temporal binding can occur when 709 
a social gaze response is perceived to result from intentional eye saccade bids for joint 710 
attention. We offer this as an implicit sense of agency effect that follows oculomotor actions 711 
that lead to a state of joint attention. 712 
6. Author note 713 
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Figure Legends 
Fig. 1. 
Trial sequence for the Active Gaze Leading task. Red circles and the arrow were not 
displayed but represent where participants were instructed to fixate and the saccade from the 
face to the object, respectively. Participants looked at the face (a), displayed for 1000ms. 
Participants made a saccade (b) to the object as soon as it appeared. After a random inter-
event interval of 400ms to 2300ms, gaze onset (c) occurred. After 1000ms, estimate 
instruction appeared (d) until response. Participants pressed and released the space bar to 
replicate the inter-event interval. The inter-event interval is the time between the object 
appearing and the gaze onset.  
Fig. 2. 
Mean percentage reproductions by condition for both experiments. In Gaze Leading tasks, 
participants looked first at the face, and then at an object as soon as it appeared. In the 
Passive Face or Passive Phase Scrambled tasks, participants looked at the face or scrambled 
face throughout. In the Passive Object task (Experiment 2), participants looked at the 
placeholder/object throughout. The images show how the face/scrambled stimulus was 
displayed when gaze onset occurred. Red circles and the arrow were not displayed but 
represent where participants were instructed to fixate (and the saccade from the face to the 
object for the Active tasks). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for within-
subjects designs calculated using the procedure recommended by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
